This paper links the two …elds of "development traps" and "brain drain". We construct a model which integrates endogenous international migration into a simple growth model. As a result the dynamics of the economy can feature some underdevelopment traps: an economy starting with a low level of human capital can be caught in a vicious circle where low level of human capital leads to low wages, and low wages leads to emigration of valuable human capital. We also show that our model displays a rich array of di¤erent dynamic regimes, including the above traps, but other regimes as well, and we link explicitly the nature of the regimes to technology and policy parameters.
Introduction
The analysis of migration has become an important branch of the development economics literature. One of its main domains is concerned with the phenomenon of brain drain, which emphasizes that an essential cause of impoverishment for developing countries is the ‡ight of skilled elites towards countries with higher standards of living. However, recent research has emphasized that brain drain can also generate positive dynamic forces for development (see Rapoport, 2008, 2012, and  McKenzie, 2011, for overviews of this literature) 1 .
Another important domain in development economics is concerned with development traps, also coined poverty traps. These models show how an economy can be characterized by multiple equilibria, and …nd itself historically trapped in an inferior equilibrium. This is a very rich area, and recent synthetic accounts of the literature can be found, for example, in Azariadis and Stachurski (2005), Bowles, Durlauf and Ho¤ (2006) and Matsuyama (2008) .
The purpose of this paper is to link the brain drain phenomenon to development traps. For that we construct a model which integrates endogenous international migration into a simple growth model. We show that the existence of brain drain can lead to multiple dynamic regimes, and that the type of regimes displayed is notably a¤ected by both technology and policy parameters.
The will to link these two literatures is not new. The …rst elaborated model implementing such integration for brain drain appears in De la Croix and Docquier (2010) , which actually inspired this paper. They combine a migration function based on wage di¤erentials with a production function inspired by Lucas (1988) , and exhibiting positive externalities. They obtain two di¤erent types of trajectories: a "vicious circle" one, with high poverty and high brain drain, and a "virtuous circle"one, with low poverty and low brain drain. The actual dynamics is led by a "sunspot"mechanism through which the economy somehow "alternates" stochastically between the two types of trajectories. That article belongs to the category of "expectations driven poverty traps", where unexpected shocks and coordination failures play a central role.
The model in this paper belongs, instead, to the alternative category of "history dependent poverty traps" 2 . In our model we have no sunspots, no coordination failures, and the dynamics are fully deterministic. Yet, we shall nevertheless exhibit a very rich set of dynamics, and notably vicious circle type dynamics. The dynamics will result from the combination of two main elements: (1) The …rst is that, as in Romer (1990) , there are positive externalities between di¤erent lines of production using skilled workers. These positive externalities will result in productivity and real wages being possibly increasing with the skilled population. (2) The second, inspired from De la Croix and Docquier (2010 , is the migration mechanism: If the real wage in the home country is low compared to the real wage abroad, then a part of the highly skilled population will emigrate.
The intuition as to why the economy can be led into a vicious circle is the following: If the skilled population is low to start with, their resulting wage is low 3 and therefore many workers emigrate abroad. This in turns 2 An interesting comparison between "history dependent dynamics" and "expectations dependent dynamics", their di¤erences and similarities, appears in Krugman's (1991) stimulating article. 3 Although this will be treated formally in section 4.3, we can already brie ‡y explain intuitively why skilled wages may be high when there are many skilled workers, and low when there are few skilled. Consider the "high number" case. Two con ‡icting e¤ects are at work. First, as in Solow-type models, diminishing returns to labor (equation 1 below) will lead to lower wages, the traditional result. But conversely, as in Romer-type models, there are positive externalities between skilled (equations 2 and 3), so that a high number of skilled workers increases the productivity of each of them, and thus their wage. As we shall see analytically below, this last e¤ect dominates when, somehow, the Romer e¤ect is stronger than the Solow e¤ect. reduces productivity and the real wage further, which will lead to further migration and so on. We clearly have a vicious circle, which can create an underdevelopment trap, because of the loss of skilled workers who had accumulated valuable human capital.
In the contrary, if the economy starts with a high level of skilled population and therefore high productivity, most skilled workers will choose to stay in the home country, which leads itself to high productivity, and we now have some sort of a virtuous circle.
As it turns out, we shall …nd that our model displays many potential di¤erent dynamic regimes, as it includes the above development traps, but other regimes as well. The nature of the regimes and the type of dynamic equilibrium depend on two sets of parameters, technology parameters and policy parameters. Let us now examine these in turn.
There are two important technology parameters: the returns to scale (à la Solow, 1956) for skilled labor and the degree of productive externalities (à la Romer, 1990) , these two parameters being linked to the functional form of the production function. This will be developed in section 3.1 below.
When positive externalities à la Romer (1990) dominate, we get the possibility of unstable equilibria, vicious circles, or virtuous circles, as we outlined above. If, however, the diminishing returns to scale dominate, the economy is much more stable and converges to some sort of "Solowian"equilibrium.
So at this stage of the reasoning we would thus have, depending on the value of the above technology parameters, two types of economies: (a) Some However, the type of economies and dynamics are not linked only to technology parameters, but also to "policy parameters". In our model, we introduce one such parameter, denoted z, which is meant to summarize all possible in ‡uences through which government can in ‡uence human capital formation.
A typical "academic" example of z is the size of higher education in the country, and investment of government in education. An increase in that variable should normally increase the number of skilled workers. This paper shows that this policy variable has a substantial e¤ect on the dynamics. 
Related literature
The literature on brain drain has, from the beginning, proposed a balanced view between the negative e¤ects (essentially the loss of human capital) and positive ones (such as remittances or contribution to "international knowledge"). Two important early articles are Grubel and Scott (1966) and Bhagwati and Hamada (1974).
We shall ourselves be emphasizing the negative e¤ects of brain drain, but we must mention that lately a number of authors have shown that the possibility of migration could create some positive e¤ects on the emigration country. This has been called a "brain gain" e¤ect. This line of research has been studied by Mountford (1997) This debate on the brain drain vs. brain gain has stimulated the development of this …eld. As emphasized by Gibson and McKenzie (2011) , the number of studies on this subject has increased in the last decade. Many contributions are empirical, although Docquier and Rapoport (2012) present in their survey a model permitting to discuss the conditions under which we get brain drain or brain gain.
The empirical literature has touched various angles of the questions, and is focusing mainly on the assessment of the size of the phenomenon, as well as on the elements a¤ecting the ‡ows, which are notably the size of the country, political instability, and low levels of human capital. The importance of migration costs should also be emphasized (see McKenzie and Rapoport, 2010) . Still, data limitations continue to be a huge challenge to work in this area, and there is a need for better data which tracks the ‡ows of high-skilled workers back and forth.
One outcome of all this research, that has been emphasized recently, is that brain drain is much more complex than the one way migration as analyzed until now. In particular the "return migration", by which the migrants end up returning to their home country, might change not only the perspective on the data but also on the models of migration (see Docquier and Rapoport, 2012) .
A particular case of this "return migration"is students, who go abroad for more education and come back to their home country. Lately these student ‡ows have substantially increased, in line with large increases in tertiary enrolment rates. This is already happening in Europe, notably due to the Bologna Process (see Brezis and Soueri, 2011) . These phenomena are likely to modify the interpretation and research on brain drain.
The literature on development traps is extremely vast, and builds on many di¤erent mechanisms. We indicated a few useful surveys in the introduction.
A wellknown contribution based on human capital accumulation is Azariadis and Drazen (1990).
There are very few papers linking the two issues of development traps and brain drain. We already described De la Croix and Docquier (2010) . Some other papers link migration and multiple equilibria, but in a di¤erent context than ours. Kwok and Leland (1982) have a model with multiple equilibria in migration, based on asymmetric information. Brezis and Krugman (1996) also present a multiple equilibria migration model, based on a Romer type model, but where the focus is on the host country and not on the country of origin. Mountford and Rapoport (2011) introduce endogenous fertility in a brain-drain environment and …nd potential multiple equilibria. There are similarities in the building blocks of these models, but they are focusing on di¤erent economic contexts. We now turn to our model.
The model
As we indicated above, the two main building blocks of our model are the technology and population dynamics due to migration. We shall now describe both more formally.
Technology
Final output Y t consists of a homogeneous good, which is produced by competitive …rms through the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
where A is an exogenous productivity parameter, L t unskilled labor and X t an index of skilled labor, which we describe in detail in the next paragraph. The parameter represents the extent of decreasing returns to scale in X t . A low means strong decreasing returns. This parameter will play an important role below.
The variable X t is an index of the productivity of the skilled workers, which re ‡ects some positive externalities between them in the tradition of Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977 , Ethier, 1982 , and Romer, 1990 . More precisely assume that skilled workers work in intermediate industries indexed by
where N t is the number of intermediate goods. Then X t is given by the standard C.E.S. formula:
The parameter depicts the extent of positive externalities between the skilled workers working in the various intermediate industries. In the limit case = 1, there are no externalities. For < 1, there are positive externalities. To show this, let us consider the simple particular case where all x jt 's are equal to the same x t . Then (2) becomes:
Since < 1, a higher number of intermediates N t increases average productivity. The lower , the higher the positive externalities. The parameter will be also important in the analysis below.
Let us now relate inputs x jt to the rest of the economy. The intermediate input x jt is produced by intermediate …rm j according to the production function:
where h jt is the amount of skilled labor employed in …rm j and f is a …xed labor cost. These …rms operate in a framework of monopolistic competition with free entry, through which the number N t will be determined endogenously, as we shall see below.
Finally we must express that the sum of skilled workers employed in all …rms j is equal to the aggregate amount of skilled labor H t :
Population dynamics
We now turn to the dynamics of skilled and unskilled workers. Since the number of unskilled workers will play little role in what follows, we shall assume to simplify that it is constant in time:
It is assumed that the number of high skilled workers, H t , evolves according to:
The …rst term in the right hand side represents the evolution of already existing skilled. First, there is a natural attrition rate a for skilled workers.
Secondly, a fraction e t 1 of skilled workers emigrates between periods t and t + 1. This is the brain drain, which we will study in detail in the next subsection.
The second term, z, represents the in ‡ux of skilled workers not related to H t . This parameter should be thought of as in ‡uenced by government policy, in many possible di¤erent manners. For example immigration quotas for skilled labor, a tool used by many governments, will directly in ‡uence this in ‡ux. Also, a greater level of higher education in the country will typically increase the number of skilled workers. All these heterogeneous in ‡uences are subsumed in the simple policy parameter z. 4
The migration function
For notational convenience, our working variable will not be the fraction of migrants e t , but rather s t = 1 e t , where s stands for "stayers", i.e. the fraction of those skilled workers who stay in the country. We shall assume that s t (and therefore e t ) is determined endogenously by:
where ! t is the real wage of skilled workers in the home country. We assume:
A typical function S (! t ) is pictured in …gure 1.
Figure 1
We will actually use in what follows migration functions of the form:
We now show that this possibility of a brain drain can modify dramatically the dynamics. We start by studying the short run equilibrium. 4 The short run equilibrium
The demand for intermediates
Let us denote as P t the price of output Y t , q jt the price of intermediate good j and V t the wage of unskilled labor. The objective of …nal output producing …rms is to maximize pro…ts:
subject to the production functions (1) and (2). We can decompose the problem in two parts. First, for any given value of X t …rms will choose the amounts of intermediate goods x jt so as to minimize costs, i.e. so as to solve:
The …rst order conditions with respect to the x jt 's yield:
where Q t is the traditional C.E.S. aggregate index:
The cost of producing X t is Q t X t . The level of X t will be chosen itself by maximizing pro…ts:
subject to production function (1) , which yields the …rst order condition: 
We …nd the following …rst order condition, traditional in monopolistic competition:
The equilibrium is symmetrical, so that x jt = x t , q jt = q t , and:
There is free entry into the intermediate …rms'industry, so the number of …rms N t is determined by the zero pro…t condition for intermediate …rms:
Combining (3), (17) and (19) we obtain: 20) and since N t (x t + f ) = N t h t = H t , we …nd the endogenous number of …rms:
The real wage of skilled workers
Since this is a central element in the migration phenomenon, we now compute the real wage ! t , i.e. the wage of skilled workers W t de ‡ated by the price of output P t :
We can decompose it as:
We know already from previous computations (equations 16, 17 and 18) :
Combining (21), (23), (24) and (25), we …nd:
with:
We see that the real wage of skilled workers is increasing in H t if > , i.e. if the e¤ect of externalities dominates the diminishing returns to scale in skilled labor. If in the contrary < , i.e. if diminishing returns dominate, then the real wage of skilled workers is decreasing in H t , the traditional result.
Dynamics and long run equilibria
Combining (7), (8) , (10) and (26) we …nd that the dynamics of H t is given by:
Long run equilibria will be solution of the equation:
We see that the long run equilibria and the dynamics of equation (28) will be di¤erent depending on whether is greater than or smaller than zero or, using equation (29), on whether is greater or smaller than . We start with the traditional case.
The traditional case
The "traditional"case is that where the diminishing returns to scale to skilled labor dominate the positive external e¤ects, i.e. where:
We can …rst compute the derivative of the function F :
where " t = " (! t ) is the elasticity of S (! t ):
Further using formula (26) , (32) becomes:
Note that, from (10), " (! t ) 1. Since moreover < and S (! t ) 1,
we have:
The equation F (H t ) = H t has a single long run equilibrium, which is dynamically stable. We denote it as H S (S for stable). This case is represented in …gure 2.
Figure 2 7 Development traps
Let us now assume that:
i.e. the positive externalities between skilled workers are dominant. In that case we shall now see that several patterns of development traps can occur.
There are actually three distinct possibilities, which we now explore in turn.
Multiple equilibria (case A)
The …rst possibility, which corresponds to …gure 3, is that where the initial "central" equilibrium, is unstable, so we denote it as H U . Two new stable equilibria, high and low, and denoted H h and H`, now appear.
Figure 3
The dynamics of H t , which is represented in …gure 3, displays multiple equilibria and strong history dependence. The actual path will fundamentally depend on whether the initial level of skilled workers H 0 is above or below H U . The last possibility is actually the most favorable of the three. Although the combination of parameters and is consistent with development traps, we see that in this case it is the low stable and middle unstable equilibria, H l and H U , that have disappeared, so that the economy will always converge toward a high equilibrium H h . This is represented in …gure 5. 8 Policy and dynamic regimes
We saw in section 7 that for > the economy becomes prone to development traps. We could distinguish, however, in such a case three di¤erent dynamic regimes (cases A, B and C above). We shall now show that the value of the policy parameter z will be instrumental in determining which of the three regimes the economy is in.
Parameters and regimes
It will be convenient for a …rst characterization of the regimes to use the auxiliary function:
The function G (H t ) starts at z, and is convex since > 0. One possibility is represented in …gure 6, which actually corresponds to regime A.
Figure 6
It is easy to see that the long run equilibria of the dynamics, i.e (c) Case C will occur if the equation G (H t ) = 0 has two complex roots.
Policy and traps
Now, using the above de…nition of the function G, (equation 37), we will
show that the conditions of proposition 1 can be transformed into simple conditions based on the value of the policy parameter z. So let us de…ne the following two threshold values for z:
One can compute that for all values of the parameters:
Accordingly the separation conditions of proposition 1 translate into: So we see that, when > , the policy parameter z is fundamental in determining, among the three cases A, B or C, the exact nature of "trap dynamics".
Conclusion
This paper has developed a simple model where brain drain can lead to development traps, even though the same economy without workers'mobility would be stable. Inspite of its simplicity this model displays multiple di¤erent dynamic regimes, including a "Solowian" one, vicious and virtuous circles, multiple equilibria and also cases where the economy can be trapped in a single low or high state. We saw that the type of regime that obtains can be related to both technological factors and policy.
Indeed, there are two important technological parameters which will have an in ‡uence on the type of equilibrium we get. The …rst one which we have denoted , is depicting the importance of decreasing returns to scale in skilled labor. A small means strong decreasing returns.
The second parameter depicts the extent of positive externalities between various sorts of skilled labors. A low value of means that these positive externalities are strong, which, ceteris paribus, increases productivity.
When is smaller than , which means that, relatively, the externalities are not strong, we are in a model akin to the classical model, and, not surprisingly, we get then a "Solowian" dynamic regime. Policy, as well as history, has no substantial long run in ‡uence.
However, when we have a strong externalities e¤ect, with > , then this will lead to several possible di¤erent dynamics, and the type of dynamics depends on government's policy variable z.
When the government has a low level of intervention z, then we have one single low equilibrium of human capital, wages and output, the trap.
When the government has a high level of intervention, then we have a high equilibrium, with high human capital, wages and output. When the size of the policy parameter is neither high or low, then we are in the case of multiple dynamic equilibria, and history matters.
The model is compact enough to serve as a simple basic framework for further research in the …eld of dynamics in brain drain models. Scholars who want to have an environment of multiple dynamic equilibria would concentrate on the A case. Those who want to always be in a trap should adopt our B case.
This paper has kept the framework simple in order to make clear the elements which trigger the di¤erent possibilities. However, of course, future work could make the policy parameter z endogenous, with the purpose of in ‡uencing dynamics in such a way that we can move from the (unsatisfactory) cases A or B to a better equilibrium like C. We leave that to future work. 
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